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CHEVRON’S GENERALITY PRINCIPLES 
Emily Hammond* 
 
Chevron is surely one of the most influential doctrines of administrative 
law.  Both in judicial opinions and the scholarly literature, its original 
insights and subsequent evolution have contributed much to our 
understanding of the roles of the “four” branches, especially as those roles 
relate to judicial review.  But what does Chevron have to say about the 
many agency behaviors that are relatively insulated from review?  The vast 
majority of agency policymaking decisions never reach court; for example, 
they might not be “final” or even “action,” or they may pose standing or 
ripeness difficulties for would-be petitioners.  This Essay argues that 
Chevron’s impact might reach even these rarely reviewed types of agency 
behavior.  Descriptively, this claim is supported by an analysis of judicial 
opinions applying Chevron principles to assess agency actions that are not 
interpretations of organic statutes.  Normatively, this claim challenges 
administrative law to turn its focus to agencies’ unreviewable discretionary 
space, where a Chevron lens offers important insights about the extent to 
which agencies can construct their own legitimacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years after the ―quiet revolution‖1 that was Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 the doctrine bearing that 
decision’s name is arguably the most cited of administrative law.3  It stands 
at the heart of judicial review of administrative action, captivating scholars’ 
imaginations and providing the seductive ease of a two-step formula for 
litigants and lower courts.  But what does the doctrine have to say about the 
many agency behaviors that are relatively insulated from judicial review?  I 
take up that question in this Essay.4 
The governing paradigm is that judicial review is a necessary component 
of administrative legitimacy.5  It acts as an ex ante check on agency 
behavior by incentivizing agencies to promote participation, engage in 
deliberation, and set forth their reasoning transparently in the first instance.6  
It promotes dialogue between the branches7 and amongst agencies and their 
stakeholders.8  And it acts as a backstop, guarding against arbitrariness9 
and—in denying petitions for review—putting the imprimatur of approval 
on various agency actions.10 
These functions, of course, are not specific to Chevron.  The Chevron 
context adds nuances.  For example, Step One promotes judicial and 
administrative uniformity because it mandates adherence to a determination 
 
 1. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 532 (6th ed. 2013). 
 2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron provided a two-step means of reviewing agencies’ 
interpretations of their statutory mandates.  First, a court asks whether Congress addressed 
the precise question at issue; second, if the text is ambiguous, the court upholds the agency’s 
construction if it is reasonable. Id. at 842–43. 
 3. EMILY HAMMOND ET AL., The Chevron Doctrine, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file with author). 
 4. This Essay is part of a larger symposium entitled Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and 
Looking Forward.  For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. 
Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 475 (2014).  Two contributors to this symposium explore other aspects of the role of 
Chevron inside the regulatory state. See Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of 
Law, and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679 
(2014) (exploring the President’s role in the Chevron deference regime); Christopher J. 
Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State:  An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 703 (2014) (exploring empirically Chevron’s effect on agency statutory interpretative 
practices). 
 5. See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial 
Review:  Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 315 
(2013) (providing background and collecting sources).  By ―legitimacy,‖ I mean both fidelity 
to statute and conformity with administrative law values such as participation, deliberation, 
and transparency. See id. at 316–17 n.18 (collecting sources). 
 6. See id. at 327; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:  
An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1691 (2004). 
 7. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1805 (2007). 
 8. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial 
Review As Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 778–89 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hammond]. 
 9. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003). 
 10. Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 322. 
2014] CHEVRON’S GENERALITY PRINCIPLES 657 
that statutory text is clear.11  And at Step Two, the agency’s explanation of 
its choice between permissible constructions is a special application of the 
reason-giving requirement underlying arbitrary and capricious review; thus, 
the administrative law norms set forth above are also furthered in the 
Chevron context.12 
But there is more.  Chevron stands for the proposition that judicial review 
is only part of the equation in the quest for administrative legitimacy.  At 
the surface, this is true because courts are instructed not to engage in de 
novo analyses of ambiguous statutes, departing from the traditional role of 
saying ―what the law is.‖13  When courts review agencies less robustly, a 
fortiori they are making themselves less necessary to ensuring agency 
legitimacy than may previously have been thought.  Indeed, the language of 
Chevron itself suggests that administrative expertise and superior political 
accountability—attributes arising within the executive branch—promote 
legitimacy and justify a correspondingly diminished role for the courts.14 
More deeply, Chevron approves of agencies’ flexibility to change their 
minds—even on questions of law.15  In Chevron itself, Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) had revised its interpretation of ―stationary 
source‖ following a change in administration.16  The decision therefore 
stands for the proposition that there is nothing inherently illegitimate in an 
agency’s revising its interpretation.17 
The changes ushered in by Chevron therefore shift the legitimation 
emphasis away from courts and toward agencies.  Suppose, however, that 
one looks even further beyond judicial review to the behavior of agencies 
themselves.  Underlying the notion that courts ought to be deferential to 
agencies is a broader principle of agency flexibility within the zones of 
statutory discretion.  Indeed, even if we remove judicial review from the 
landscape altogether, Chevron offers insights for agencies’ ability to 
construct their own legitimacy. 
In this Essay, I explore that hypothesis.  First, it is helpful to clarify what 
I mean by an agency constructing its own legitimacy.  I define legitimacy 
 
 11. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 968–
69 (2005) (holding that Step One decisions have preclusive effect); Peter L. Strauss, One 
Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:  Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited 
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118–29 (1987) 
(arguing that Chevron’s structure promotes Supreme Court correction of lower court 
mistakes more readily than would a multifactor inquiry). 
 12. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 3, at 28–29 (describing competing understandings 
and urging this particular Step Two approach). 
 13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 14. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984). 
 15. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (noting that under Chevron, ―the agency is free to give the statute 
whichever of several possible meanings it thinks most conducive to accomplishment of the 
statutory purpose‖). 
 16. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851. 
 17. See id. at 853–58; Scalia, supra note 15, at 518; see also FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–16 (2009) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard does not require heightened explanation when an agency departs from prior policy). 
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broadly, encompassing both statutory and democratic legitimacy.  An 
important premise of this Essay is that administrative law values—
participation, deliberation, transparency, and reason-giving—further both 
kinds of legitimacy.18  In the absence of judicial review, however, it is 
exceedingly difficult to measure an agency’s performance.  Although one 
may be able to identify participation-enhancing procedures or reason-
giving, there is no real baseline against which to assess the norm of 
―legitimacy.‖19  Nor can one objectively determine that an agency’s 
ultimate action best furthers a statute’s policies because ―best‖ is in the eye 
of the beholder.20 
There are at least a few guiding principles, operating across a spectrum.  
At one end of the spectrum is the principle from Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns21 that an agency cannot cure an unconstitutional delegation 
of power by adopting a limiting construction of its statutory mandate.22  
That is, an agency’s ―voluntary self-denial‖ of power cannot undo an 
unconstitutional delegation of that power by the legislature.23  In such 
circumstances, courts are at the zenith of their power and agencies are 
wholly unable to impact their own legitimacy. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the doctrine enunciated in United 
States v. Mead Corp.24  One product of that decision is the difficult-to-
apply principle that agencies can influence the level of deference they 
receive by choosing procedures that tend to ―foster fairness and 
deliberation.‖25  This link between agency choice of procedure and 
substantive legitimacy has important ramifications for judicial review.26  
But does it hold lessons for agencies’ behavior more generally? 
The question has real-world implications.  Agencies constantly face new 
circumstances in which their statutory mandates provide little guidance or 
even clear authority.27  Topics such as sustainability, climate change, and 
energy policy lack comprehensive statutory schemes; agencies must rely on 
their inherent discretionary authority to tackle these issues.  Consider, for 
example, an EPA guidance document issued in conjunction with a 
 
 18. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 320–27 (drawing on administrative law 
and procedural justice literatures to consider how judicial review furthers administrative 
legitimacy). 
 19. My coauthor and I recently attempted to do this and found the issue of testability 
very challenging. See id. at 327–30 (developing metrics for legitimacy); id. at 362–63 
(discussing limitations of those metrics). 
 20. See id. at 353 (providing example). 
 21. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 22. Id. at 472–73. 
 23. Id. at 473. 
 24. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 25. Id. at 230; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 273, 279–80 (2011) (describing the puzzles of this part of the Mead decision). 
 26. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (setting forth Skidmore-like 
factors for use in Step Zero analyses); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 
187, 213–19 (2006) (providing examples of how lower courts have connected choice of 
procedure to standard of review following Mead and Barnhart). 
 27. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393033. 
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rulemaking that imposed stricter Clean Air Act (CAA) controls on 
emissions of air toxics from electricity generation.  Section 112 of the CAA 
requires existing sources to meet the rule’s standards within three years of 
the effective date of the rule.28  The CAA also provides limited 
circumstances in which EPA may extend the time to comply with such 
standards.29 
In the face of strong opposition from the coal-fired electricity industry, 
which argued that the new standards would diminish electricity reliability, 
President Obama directed EPA to issue a guidance memo that explained 
how it would address compliance with the standards in the coming years.30  
In this memo, EPA indicated its intent to use its enforcement discretion to 
liberally grant time extensions to electricity generators that made certain 
showings related to reliability.31  But the CAA does not specifically address 
the reliability issue:  EPA exercised its discretion, using an unreviewable 
approach,32 to accommodate competing public interests in clean air and 
electricity reliability. 
Can agencies construct their own intrinsic legitimacy in the absence of 
judicial review?33  And if so, are there any limits on agencies’ abilities to 
take such actions?  This Essay posits that Chevron—while not directly 
imposing those limits—indeed influences our sense of what those limits are.  
Moreover, it informs the quest to look beyond judicial review for sources of 
agency legitimacy.  In essence, Chevron stands for a variety of ―generality‖ 
principles that extend broadly throughout administrative law.  And in 
particular, my ultimate focus here is on ―intrinsic‖ agency legitimacy, 
which is meant to capture the ideals of agency legitimacy in the absence of 
external oversight.  Chevron’s generality principles, I argue, suggest 
metrics for assessing that legitimacy. 
Part I of this Essay begins by elaborating the spectrum described in this 
Introduction.  As already alluded to, Chevron interacts strongly with each 
doctrine on the spectrum.  Next, Part I delves into what I call ―second-
order‖ Chevron decisions—that is, those opinions applying Chevron to 
agency interpretations of text not appearing in their statutory mandates.  
 
 28. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-159, § 112(i)(3)(A), 69 Stat. 
322 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7626). 
 29. Id. § 112(i)(3)(B), (4)–(6). 
 30. Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r of the Office of Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance, to Regional Administrators (EPA Regions I–X) et al. (Dec. 16, 
2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/EnforcementResponsePolicyforCAA113 
.pdf. 
 31. See id. at 4. 
 32. The approach is doubly unreviewable.  As a guidance document, it is difficult to 
challenge given various reviewability doctrines like finality and ripeness. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 
(2012) (finality); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (ripeness).  And as an 
exercise of enforcement discretion, it is presumptively unreviewable in any event. See 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 33. I refer to ―intrinsic‖ legitimacy synonymously with ―inside-out‖ legitimacy, as 
coined by Professors Shapiro and Wright and as I have adopted the terms in my own work. 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency:  
Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 578 (2011); cf. Hammond 
& Markell, supra note 5, at 316 n.12. 
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This discussion reveals a comprehensive commitment to the underlying 
background principles upon which Chevron was initially based.  Part I 
concludes by showing how those background principles inform our sense of 
legitimacy for agency actions generally, even in the absence of judicial 
review.  Although this Essay acknowledges the difficulty of measuring 
agency legitimacy for activities not subject to judicial review, it suggests in 
Part II that Chevron’s background principles inform even this more elusive 
context.  Part II suggests potential metrics for gauging intrinsic agency 
legitimacy, while acknowledging the difficulties attendant in 
operationalizing at least some of the metrics.  After considering this and 
other potential objections to my approach, this Essay returns to the concept 
of Chevron as a generality principle, reinforcing how that doctrine informs 
the legitimacy of elusive agency behaviors. 
I.   THE SPECTRUM FOR CONSTRUCTING LEGITIMACY 
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered some guidance on 
agencies’ ability to construct their own legitimacy.  To illustrate, this 
section considers three such decisions with deeply relevant connections to 
Chevron:  Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v. EPA,34 and United States v. Mead Corp.35 
A.   Guideposts 
1.   Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns 
Prior to any consideration of agency legitimacy is the constitutional 
legitimacy of the delegation in an agency’s statutory mandate.  Although 
the Court has not invalidated any statute on nondelegation grounds since the 
1930s,36 the nondelegation doctrine influences administrative law in 
important ways. 
In American Trucking, various petitioners representing industry interests 
challenged EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for 
certain air pollutants.37  The NAAQS were promulgated pursuant to the 
CAA, which instructed in relevant part that EPA was to set such standards 
based on criteria ―requisite to protect the public health‖ with ―an adequate 
margin of safety.‖38  EPA’s task wasn’t easy:  for nonthreshold pollutants, 
those for which there is no known exposure threshold below which there 
 
 34. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 35. To this list might be added City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), which 
held that Chevron applies to agencies’ interpretations of the scope of their statutory 
jurisdiction. 
 36. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 37. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462–63 (2001). 
 38. Id. at 465; 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
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are no adverse impacts, crafting a numerical exposure standard meant 
making a policy judgment in light of scientific uncertainty.39 
Although EPA developed a set of factors to explain its decision to set the 
standards at particular points, the D.C. Circuit concluded that those factors 
were too indeterminate; moreover, the statute itself did not provide EPA 
any guidance in deciding where to draw the line.40  Thus, the court 
remanded the case to EPA to adopt an approach that would supply the 
missing determinacy.41  The court’s rationale was two-fold.  First, if an 
agency creates binding standards for itself, it is less likely to act 
arbitrarily.42  And second, if the agency created such standards, those would 
facilitate judicial review.43  Although the court had acknowledged that this 
approach meant the agency, rather than Congress, would be making 
important policy decisions, it reasoned that EPA could use its expertise to 
―salvage‖ the statute.44 
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court rejected the 
possibility that an agency can cure an unconstitutional delegation of power:  
―an agency’s voluntary self-denial‖ would itself be an exercise of 
―forbidden‖ power.45  The Court offered little more guidance and did not 
engage the D.C. Circuit’s rationale,46 but the bottom line was clear:  when 
confronted directly with nondelegation concerns, agencies may not 
construct their own legitimacy. 
How does this principle relate to Chevron?  As Professor Pierce has 
explained, Chevron helps enforce the nondelegation doctrine because it 
changes the incentives for Congress.47  That is, rather than attempt the 
impossible task of delineating rules for Congress to follow in creating 
permissible delegations, the Court has signaled to Congress that it will 
consider ambiguous statutory terms as evidence that Congress intends the 
Executive to have primary policymaking authority.48  If Congress wishes to 
avoid this result, it can enact statutes that are more detailed and hence, less 
open to agency interpretation.49 
2.   Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA 
Chevron’s relationship to the nondelegation doctrine helps explain 
another CAA decision, Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. EPA.  As a 
 
 39. For further discussion, see Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034–37 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 40. Id. at 1034. 
 41. Id. at 1038. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). 
 46. Instead, the Court proceeded to explain why the statute was sufficiently intelligible 
to fit within existing nondelegation jurisprudence. Id. at 473–76. 
 47. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 
2230–32 (1997). 
 48. See id. at 2231. 
 49. See id. at 2232. 
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result of earlier developments,50 EPA promulgated regulations setting 
standards for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles.51  
The Agency determined that regulating such emissions triggered an 
obligation to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources under, 
among other things, the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) 
provisions of the CAA.52   This result followed because ―air pollutant‖ was 
used in operative provisions of each title—and ―air pollutant‖ included 
GHGs.53 
When EPA issued the relevant rule, however, it explained a fundamental 
problem it faced:  the PSD provisions of the statute explicitly apply to 
sources emitting 100 or 250 tons per year of ―air pollutants.‖54  But GHGs 
are emitted at much higher levels, and applying the statute literally would 
have significantly enlarged the number of sources subject to the program, 
placed enormous burdens on the permitting authorities, and, essentially, 
gone far beyond Congress’s intent that only major sources should be subject 
to PSD requirements.55   Nevertheless, EPA explained that the statute’s use 
of ―air pollutant‖ compelled its interpretation, so it issued the ―Tailoring 
Rule,‖ which set the applicable emissions limits at 75,000 or 100,000 tons 
per year, as a way of departing from the statutory text ―no more than 
necessary to render the requirements administrable.‖56 
When the Supreme Court confronted the Tailoring Rule, it applied the 
Chevron doctrine to EPA’s interpretation of its statutory mandate.57  But 
the Court rejected EPA’s interpretation without even engaging the agency’s 
explanation.  First, the Court reasoned that the statute did not compel EPA’s 
interpretation:  ―air pollutant‖ as used in the operative provisions of the 
statute did not necessarily carry the same meaning as the term when used 
broadly in the statute’s general definitions.58  Second, the Court explained 
that EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable 
because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion 
in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.  
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded 
power to regulate ―a significant portion of the American economy,‖ we 
typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.  We 
 
 50. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding CAA’s term ―air 
pollutant‖ encompasses greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and holding EPA’s rationale for 
failure to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles arbitrary and capricious). 
 51. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2437 (2014). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 2442–43 (describing the statute and EPA’s rule). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,517 (proposed June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 
71). 
 57. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439. 
 58. Id. at 2439–42. 
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expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency 
decisions of vast ―economic and political significance.‖59 
In other words, the precise language of the statute, if followed, would have 
so expanded EPA’s jurisdiction that Congress simply could not have 
intended that result.  It is perhaps curious that the Court announced this 
interpretation at Step Two, rather than Step One; after all, Step One is 
primarily directed at determining whether Congress intended to delegate 
interpretive authority to the agency with regard to the precise question at 
issue.60 
But could EPA’s Tailoring Rule save its interpretation?  No, said the 
Court.  Even though EPA had adopted a construction of the statute that 
limited its jurisdiction,61 it had departed from the clear statutory text.62  
Although the CAA granted EPA broad power, the agency did not have the 
power to ―revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in 
practice.‖63 
UARG’s result is unusual from a Chevron standpoint.  The Court held 
that there was ambiguity in the term ―air pollutant,‖ but that EPA’s 
interpretation was unreasonable because it would extend EPA’s jurisdiction 
far beyond that intended by Congress.  And EPA’s attempt to limit its 
jurisdiction with the Tailoring Rule was impermissible because it 
contradicted the express language of the CAA.  The result appears to be that 
EPA is foreclosed from regulating GHGs under the applicable stationary 
source provisions because there is no way to do so that would avoid the 
numerical limits Congress provided.64 
Typically, EPA could try again on remand to adopt a permissible 
construction of the ambiguous term ―air pollutant.‖65  Here, however, the 
result is such that the Court’s pronouncement is binding, having the same 
impact as if the Court held that the meaning of ―air pollutant‖ is clear in 
foreclosing GHGs for the operative provisions of the statute.  In other 
words, EPA is unable to adopt a limiting construction of the CAA to 
assuage concerns that its jurisdiction under the statute would otherwise 
extend too far.  While not a nondelegation case, the Court’s emphasis on the 
need for Congress to speak clearly if it wishes an agency to regulate ―a 
significant portion of the American economy‖ does not seem too far 
 
 59. Id. at 2444 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 159–
60 (2000)). 
 60. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 61. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2454 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that EPA’s interpretation exempts sources from regulation). 
 62. Id. at 2445. 
 63. Id. at 2446. 
 64. EPA retains authority to regulate GHGs under other provisions of the CAA, 
however. Id. at 2448–49 (upholding EPA’s permissible construction of statute for other types 
of sources of GHGs). 
 65. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980–
91 (2005) (applying Chevron framework to FCC decision). 
664 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
removed from the logic of American Trucking.66  Further, the case 
illustrates how Chevron might work as a nondelegation incentivizer.  
Congress set precise, numerical limits on EPA’s authority, which easily 
obviated any concern that intelligible principles were lacking.  The agency, 
in turn, was limited in the sense that, with respect to that precise issue, it 
had no flexibility to adopt a different interpretation.  This case thus 
illustrates the nondelegation basis for Chevron while also providing a stark 
example of the potential power of statutory text.  When such text is 
extremely precise, agencies may not depart from the statutory terms, 
regardless of broader statutory purposes or the administrative law values 
evident in the agencies’ means of adopting their particular constructions. 
3.   United States v. Mead Corp. 
The first two cases above illustrate how an agency may be completely 
barred from creating its legitimacy.  The Mead decision, a direct descendant 
of Chevron, offers an important point of contrast.  That case, of course, 
involved the U.S. Customs Service’s decision classifying Mead planners as 
diaries for tariff purposes.67  The Court concluded that the decision was not 
Chevron-eligible because it did not have the force of law, but that the lesser 
Skidmore deference standard applied.68  The Court explained that 
congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority was the linchpin of 
Chevron, but it (perplexingly) stated that a good indication of such 
delegation would be when Congress provides for agency procedures that 
―tend[] to foster [] fairness and deliberation.‖69  Although this phrase 
focuses on what procedures Congress has required, the opinion itself 
focuses on the procedures the agency actually used, notwithstanding that it 
is hard to see how an agency’s choice of procedures has anything to do with 
congressional intent.70 
Despite this awkward logic, Mead is important as a practical matter 
because it means an agency’s procedural choices matter.  Professor 
Bressman has explained one way this works:  Mead furthers the courts’ role 
in mediating the relationship between Congress and agencies because it 
calls for enhanced judicial oversight in situations where agency actions are 
 
 66. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444; Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 
(2001) (explaining that Congress must provide more guidance for standards ―that affect the 
entire national economy‖). 
 67. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
 68. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 69. Id. at 230. 
 70. See id. at 233–34 (discussing why tariff classification was not Chevron-eligible); see 
also Seidenfeld, supra note 25, at 279–80 (making this point).  This is not to say that there is 
always a tension between an agency’s choice of procedures and congressional intent.  For 
example, the two are aligned when agencies choose to exercise their rulemaking authority as 
authorized by Congress, according to notice-and-comment procedures. See City of Arlington 
v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013) (finding that Chevron was applicable to agency’s 
construction of its own jurisdiction where Congress vested the agency with authority to 
administer a statute by rulemaking and adjudication, and when the agency exercised that 
authority). 
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insulated from legislative oversight.71  In other words, if agencies fail to use 
procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking that facilitate legislative 
oversight because of their transparency and reason-giving, courts will step 
in with the closer look afforded by the Skidmore standard. 
Such actions are often shielded from stakeholder oversight as well.  For 
example, scholars have criticized nonlegislative rules for being 
nonparticipatory, excluding stakeholders from notice-and-comment 
procedures and making it more difficult to monitor agency behavior.72 
Courts considering whether to apply Chevron to agency actions that are 
not in the Chevron-presumptive categories of formal proceedings or notice-
and-comment rulemaking have taken notice of the importance of 
procedures.  Where courts have extended Chevron deference to such 
actions, the actions typically were within the agency’s expertise, exhibited 
transparency through publication in the Federal Register, evidenced some 
type of participation through stakeholder input or a comment period, and 
revealed reasoned decisionmaking through written explanations.73  In other 
words, although agencies have significant discretion in their choice of 
procedure,74 and although courts may not impose procedures on agencies 
beyond those required by Congress or the Constitution,75 agencies are 
rewarded with Chevron eligibility when they use procedures that enhance 
administrative law values. 
Of course, these observations stem from examples involving judicial 
review.  By linking legitimizing procedures to Chevron eligibility, however, 
the Court has offered important clues about the room within which agencies 
may construct their intrinsic legitimacy.  With that in mind, this Essay turns 
next to the second-order Chevron decisions. 
 
 71. See Bressman, supra note 7, at 1791–92. 
 72. See, e.g., id. at 1793 (―Unless the position is authoritative, constituents do not know 
what to monitor.‖); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 440–41 (2007) (suggesting reforms for enhanced 
accountability with respect to guidance documents that ultimately rely on judicial review as 
a check); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance 
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 342–44 (2011) (describing the potential for agency abuse 
of guidance documents). 
 73. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1273 
(11th Cir. 2009) (applying Chevron to agency handbook that underwent the same procedures 
as official regulations); Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 60–61 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (applying Chevron to HUD policy statement that had been published in the 
Federal Register and met various other factors); Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 
1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (similar).  Many scholars offer further discussion on this point. 
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1488 (2005) (suggesting that courts look for ―minimum indicia of 
lawmaking authority‖ meant to show ―considered judgment and consistent application‖); 
Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 490 (2013) 
(describing lower courts’ responses); cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) 
(setting forth, in dicta, factors bearing on whether nonpresumptive Chevron actions are 
eligible for Chevron deference). 
 74. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 75. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 543 (1978). 
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B.   Second-Order Chevron Decisions 
This section considers judicial extensions of Chevron to agency actions 
in which agencies are not interpreting their statutory mandates.  These 
second-order Chevron decisions provide a helpful contrast to run-of-the-
mill Chevron cases because they invite scrutiny of the principles animating 
Chevron.  Studying the reasoning of courts determining whether to extend 
Chevron in this way illuminates the doctrine’s background principles for 
how agencies legitimate their behavior.  Others have considered how courts 
ought approach the ―Step Zero‖ question whether to apply Chevron to 
agencies’ interpretations of their statutory mandates.76  The difference for 
the analysis here is two-fold.  First, those considerations are typically aimed 
at agencies’ interpretations of their statutory mandates; here I am focused 
on second-order extensions.  Second, those considerations are typically 
aimed at understanding the courts’ role vis-à-vis the executive and 
legislative branches and the external oversight provided by the different 
branches; here I am focused on intrinsic legitimacy in the absence of 
external oversight. 
To provide focus, consider whether agencies should receive Chevron 
deference for interpretations of contracts concerning their areas of expertise.  
First, it bears repeating that the concept of deference to agencies did not 
begin with Chevron—and that case itself stated as much.77  This 
proposition is also supported by the 1960 Supreme Court decision Texas 
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.78  There, the Court declined to 
defer to the Federal Power Commission’s interpretation of a contract for the 
purchase of natural gas because the agency had relied on ordinary rules of 
contract interpretation rather than its special expertise.79 
Rather than characterizing the matter as one purely of law, the Court 
looked specifically to how the agency had arrived at its interpretation.80  
Instead of revealing the agency’s interpretation to have been ―on the basis 
of specialized knowledge gained from experience in the regulation of the 
natural gas business, or upon the basis of any trade practice,‖ the record 
disclosed that the agency applied ordinary principles of contract 
interpretation.81  This approach exemplifies an early indication of agencies’ 
ability to construct their own legitimacy, insofar as their choice of rationale 
and application of expertise may be relevant to the deference they 
ultimately receive.82  Moreover, it foreshadows both Chevron’s reliance on 
 
 76. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 73; Sunstein, supra note 26. 
 77. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (citing Labor Bd. v. Hearst Pubs., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)). 
 78. 363 U.S. 263 (1960). 
 79. Id. at 268–69. 
 80. The Court cited the Chenery I principle that courts are to review agency decisions on 
the basis of the record at the time the decisions were made. Id. at 270 (citing SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)). 
 81. Id. at 268. 
 82. A number of lower courts have explained Texas Gas as one favoring de novo review 
for questions of law, thereby limiting that decision’s rationale more than warranted. See, e.g., 
Muratore v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 222 F.3d 918, 921–22 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Texas 
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expertise as one of the reasons for deference and Mead’s indication that 
agency procedures matter. 
Indeed, after Chevron, many courts, especially the D.C. Circuit, 
considered extending the doctrine to second-order contexts.  Those that 
have done so have placed importance on the following factors:  
(1) delegation of some authority over the text; (2) actual or presumed 
agency expertise; (3) consideration of the agency procedures that were 
used; (4) the agency’s need to promote national uniformity; and (5) the 
agency’s consistency in its interpretation over time.83 
In the 1987 decision National Fuel Gas Supply v. FERC,84 for example, 
the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that it should review a FERC-
approved settlement agreement concerning natural gas rates de novo 
because the meaning of the agreement was a question of law.85  The court 
reasoned that, although a settlement agreement was not written by Congress 
but by private parties, Congress nevertheless intended that FERC should be 
given deference because of the agency’s broad powers of adjudication.86  
Indeed, Congress had required the agency to ―take an active role in 
approving the agreement.‖87 
With this statement, the court suggested that Chevron’s fictional intent 
requirement was satisfied.  But the court explained that there were other 
reasons for affording deference.  When FERC interprets settlement 
agreements, those interpretations are enhanced by the agency’s technical 
knowledge:  ―Construction of a settlement agreement will be influenced by 
the agency’s expertise in the technical language of that field and by its 
greater knowledge of industry conditions and practices, including its more 
comprehensive experience with the kinds of disputes and negotiations that 
generally produce such an agreement.‖88  This explanation echoes the 
expertise rationale of Chevron and is not inconsistent with Texas Gas. 
Uniformity principles also informed the court’s analysis.  In deciding 
whether the agreement met the statute’s just and reasonable standard, the 
court reasoned that FERC may have understood the terms to hold particular 
meaning; a contrary judicial interpretation could undermine that 
conclusion.89 
 
Gas as having been modified by Chevron); Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 
1570 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same); see also Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 
1549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (―[T]he Texas Gas rule does not survive the Supreme Court’s 
Chevron decision.‖); cf. Bos. Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating 
both that agencies are entitled to some deference regarding interpretations rooted in expertise 
and that ―agency decision[s] based on pure questions of law may be reviewed de novo‖ 
(citing Texas Gas, 363 U.S. at 268–70). 
 83. As noted infra note 122, these factors look very similar to those of Skidmore as well 
as Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 84. 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 85. Id. at 1563. 
 86. Id. at 1569–70 & 1570 n.3. 
 87. Id. at 1571. 
 88. Id. at 1570. 
 89. Id. at 1571. 
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Although National Fuel Gas Supply involved a settlement of an 
adjudication before FERC, the D.C. Circuit quickly extended its Chevron 
approach to FERC’s interpretations of contracts that the agency approved.90  
And indeed, the D.C. Circuit later held FERC’s contract interpretations are 
Chevron-eligible even where the contract did not need agency approval to 
take effect.91 
A more recent decision, Entergy Services, Inc. v. FERC,92 highlights the 
applicable standard of review and provides further insights into Chevron’s 
generality principles.93  The case is instructive because it reveals the 
distance between second-order interpretations and agencies’ interpretations 
of their statutory mandates.  Entergy involved a 1977 contract for delivery 
of electricity on the wholesale market.94  The parties jointly owned several 
power generating facilities, but only the seller, an electric services 
company, had control over scheduling and dispatch.95  The parties’ contract 
included two different pricing schemes, which varied according to whether 
the jointly-owned generation could supply all or some of the buyer’s 
demand.96  For example, when the generation could not meet demand, the 
buyer would pay a higher amount to the seller because according to the 
contract, the buyer did not have ―sufficient resources available.‖97 
Increasingly, however, the generation was physically capable of meeting 
demand, but transmission system constraints made it impossible for the 
seller to actually use that generation.98  The seller attempted to charge the 
buyer the higher price, arguing that the terms ―sufficient‖ and ―available‖ 
meant not just physical generation but also the seller’s ability to use that 
generation.99  The buyer filed a complaint with FERC, arguing that the 
higher price did not apply because its generation was both sufficient and 
available.100 
FERC agreed with the buyer.  In its order on the dispute, FERC reasoned 
that the contract language was ambiguous because it was capable of holding 
at least two meanings.101  The agency used canons of contract 
interpretation,102 analysis of other contract terms,103 and extrinsic evidence 
of the parties’ conduct to determine that the higher price did not apply.104 
 
 90. See Vt. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. v. FERC, 817 F.2d 127, 134–35 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(involving FERC-approved contract between a utility and state utilities commission for 
electric power delivery). 
 91. Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 1549–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 92. 568 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 93. Id. at 981. 
 94. Id. at 979. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 980. 
 97. Id. at 979. 
 98. Id. at 980. 
 99. Id. at 983. 
 100. Id. at 981. 
 101. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., No. EL05-15-001, 2006 WL 3030149, 
at *13–14 (FERC Oct. 25, 2006) (Order on Initial Decision). 
 102. Id. at *11 n.47. 
 103. Id. at *10–13. 
 104. Id. at *18–19. 
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On petition for review, the D.C. Circuit explained: 
 We review claims that the Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in interpreting contracts within its jurisdiction by employing 
the familiar principles of Chevron . . . .  We evaluate de novo the 
Commission’s determination that a contract is ambiguous, but we give 
Chevron-like deference to its reasonable interpretation of ambiguous 
contract language.105 
The court agreed that the contract was ambiguous, and it adopted the 
reasoning set forth in FERC’s initial order.106  In determining that FERC’s 
interpretation was reasonable, the court followed FERC’s approach of 
considering canons of interpretation, other terms in the contract, and the 
parties’ course of dealing.107  Finally, in response to the petitioner’s 
argument that FERC should have awarded extra compensation as a matter 
of fairness, the court stated:   
[T]he question before us is not whether the contract was reasonable, a 
technical issue as to which courts have little expertise, but rather whether 
FERC’s construction of that contract was reasonable—the kind of legal 
dispute that this court resolves every day.  And as to the latter, we have no 
doubt.108 
FERC’s detailed initial order and order on petition for rehearing reveal 
analyses far more deeply grounded in an understanding of the industry than 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion.109  The agency’s superior expertise is evident, as 
is its reasoned decisionmaking and transparent explanation of its decision.  
Relatedly, the contract interpretation took place in the context of a formal 
adjudication authorized by Congress, which provided the procedural 
safeguards found in §§ 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.110  
Although the context is not an interpretation of a statutory mandate, 
therefore, Chevron principles can be used to justify the court’s approach on 
review.111 
It is tempting to wonder if the FERC example is agency-specific 
precedent, with little persuasive force outside of cases involving that 
agency.112  Or perhaps it is specific to the D.C. Circuit.  The approach, 
 
 105. Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 568 F.3d 978, 981–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted).  The court further explained that the background of negotiations and the parties’ 
course of dealing were relevant considerations for interpreting ambiguous contracts. Id. at 
982. 
 106. See id. at 983. 
 107. Id. at 983–85. 
 108. Id. at 985. 
 109. See generally Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., No. EL05-15-001, 2007 
WL 1814451 (FERC June 25, 2007) (Order on Rehearing); Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 2006 
WL 3030149. 
 110. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (1990). 
 111. See also Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. FERC, 667 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(applying Chevron deference to FERC interpretation of settlement agreement involving 
electric reliability). 
 112. See generally Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011).  Others have discussed the FERC context. See, e.g., Timothy K. 
Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
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however, shows up in other contexts and in other courts.  The District Court 
for the District of Columbia, for example, cited National Fuel Gas Supply 
in extending deference to the Interior Board of Land Appeals’ construction 
of a land patent’s ambiguous language involving the status of a right-of-
way in Bolack Minerals Co. v. Norton.113  The court emphasized the 
importance of delegation,114 expertise,115 and uniformity116 in so doing.  
Similar themes are echoed in decisions of other courts.117 
On the matter of expertise, the Tenth Circuit has explained that ―under 
the principles of Chevron . . . an agency’s interpretation of a contract is 
reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard when the subject 
matter of the contract involves the agency’s specialized expertise.‖118  Yet 
the court determined that such deference was not warranted when the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpreted a sentencing 
agreement because the agreement was not within HHS’s expertise.119  The 
court reasoned that the agreement did not deal with ―arcane subject matter‖ 
or contain technical terms; HHS did not routinely interpret such 
agreements; and reviewing such agreements had not been delegated to HHS 
by Congress.120  As a result, the court interpreted the agreement de novo.121 
The final factor—delegation by Congress—makes this case 
distinguishable from National Fuel Gas Supply because in the latter 
instance, FERC had authority to adjudicate the relevant contracts.  But also 
of interest, the first two considerations on which the Tenth Circuit relied—
agency expertise and experience—represent a functional approach to 
determining whether deference ought to be afforded.122 
 
203, 213 n.27 (2004) (―[FERC] appears consistently to receive judicial deference to its 
interpretations of the terms of contracts between parties who are subject to its regulatory 
jurisdiction.‖); Jerome Nelson, The Chevron Deference Rule and Judicial Review of FERC 
Orders, 9 ENERGY L.J. 59, 65–82 (1988) (providing a summary of Chevron’s FERC context). 
 113. 370 F. Supp. 2d 161, 175 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 175–76. 
 115. Id. at 176. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See, e.g., Muratore v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 222 F.3d 918, 923 (11th Cir. 
2000) (extending Chevron to an Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) interpretation of 
a federal employee’s health insurance contract; factors included delegation, expertise, and 
uniformity). 
 118. Sternberg v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 299 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(internal citation omitted).  The Tenth Circuit’s approach is traceable to National Gas Fuel 
Supply. See Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 61 F.3d 1479, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying 
National Fuel Gas Supply rationale to FERC’s interpretation of natural gas pipeline tariff). 
 119. Sternberg, 299 F.3d at 1205. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1205–06. 
 122. This approach is not altogether different from that suggested in Justice Breyer’s 
Barnhart dictum. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (citing ―the interstitial 
nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the 
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the 
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time‖ as 
reasons for Chevron deference).  Indeed, even courts that reject a categorical second-order 
Chevron approach have recognized the functional approach of Texas Gas. See Amoco Prod. 
Co. v. FERC, 765 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Bos. Edison, Co. v. FERC, 233 
F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (―FERC is entitled to some deference in construing contracts 
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Relatedly, the D.C. Circuit has applied a functional approach in stating 
that agency interpretations may not warrant Chevron deference when the 
agency has vacillated in its position over time.123  In Idaho Power v. 
FERC,124 the court rejected FERC’s interpretation of a right-of-first-refusal 
provision in a filed contract to provide electric transmission service both 
because the agency’s interpretation had changed over time and because it 
was ―nonsensical.‖125  At issue was FERC’s pro forma, required right-of-
first-refusal term for Open-Access Transmission Tariffs (OATTs) 
developed pursuant to FERC Order 888.126  Under this term, the 
transmission company was required to give a right of first refusal to 
incumbent customers provided that they accepted contract terms ―at least 
equal to‖ those offered by new, competing customers.127  FERC interpreted 
that language to mean that the competing customers’ terms had to be 
―substantially the same in all respects‖ to trigger the tariff’s 
requirements.128  The court reasoned, first, that FERC’s interpretation was 
nonsensical and in conflict with other terms in the tariff because the 
interpretation would preclude new customers from making better offers.129  
Additionally, the interpretation conflicted with Order 888, among others, 
 
where the sales are subject to FERC regulation.‖); City of Kaukauna v. FERC, 214 F.3d 888, 
894–95 (7th Cir. 2000); Wash. Urban League v. FERC, 886 F.2d 1381, 1386 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(―We generally defer to an agency’s interpretation of agreements within the scope of the 
agency’s expertise, and the case for deference is particularly strong when the agency has 
interpreted regulatory terms regarding which it must often apply its expertise.‖ (citation 
omitted)).  The Fifth Circuit also reviews agencies’ contract interpretations de novo, though 
it does not appear to have considered directly whether Chevron counsels a different 
approach. See Davidson v. Glickman, 169 F.3d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying de novo 
standard to review of agency’s interpretation of crop insurance contract); see also Burgin v. 
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 120 F.3d 494, 497–98 (4th Cir. 1997) (similar). But see Campbell v. 
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 384 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955 (W.D. Va. 2004) (distinguishing 
Burgin and citing Chevron, reasoning that a full understanding of contract terms depended 
on agency’s expertise).  For more on whether courts should grant deference to agencies’ 
common law interpretations, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in 
Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799 (2010). See also Cuomo v. Clearing 
House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009) (all members of the Court deemed Chevron applicable, 
but the Justices disagreed how it should apply). 
 123. See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. 
Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 1550–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (declining to 
adopt vacillation rationale and applying Chevron where agency had adopted different 
interpretation on rehearing).  There is of course some tension between an agency developing 
consistent national policy yet changing its position over time. Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (holding that only a prior 
judicial determination of a statute’s unambiguous meaning precludes an agency from later 
changing its interpretation). 
 124. 312 F.3d 454 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 125. Id. at 462. 
 126. In Order No. 888, FERC required utilities to separate their transmission functions 
from their wholesale merchant functions. See generally Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; 
Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385) [hereinafter Order No. 888]. 
 127. Idaho Power, 312 F.3d at 457. 
 128. Id. at 462. 
 129. Id. 
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and was a departure from FERC’s longstanding interpretation of the same 
term in other pro forma tariffs.130 
One final example of a second-order Chevron case is Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma,131 which involved a federal agency’s interpretation of state 
law.132  There, EPA had issued a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit to a discharger in Arkansas, upstream of 
Oklahoma.133  The operative provisions of the Clean Water Act134 require 
that any permit be consistent with both states’ water quality criteria.135  
Oklahoma challenged the permit, arguing that its waters would be degraded 
by the discharge and thus, that the permit should not have been granted.136  
Interpreting that state’s standards, EPA determined that the permit could be 
issued provided that there was no detectable violation of Oklahoma’s water 
quality standards.137  Finding no violation, the agency issued the permit.138  
The Tenth Circuit, however, held that even an undetectable contribution to 
the degradation of Oklahoma’s waters was impermissible.139 
The Supreme Court reversed.  With respect to the degradation issue, it 
cited Chevron and held that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to give 
deference to EPA’s interpretation of the Oklahoma standard.140  This 
conclusion was based on several considerations.  First, the state water 
quality standards (which were established by the state with guidance from 
EPA and approved by EPA) took on the character of federal law by virtue 
of their incorporation into the federal NPDES permitting scheme.141  
Second, intrastate water pollution is a matter of federal law.142  And third, 
―treating state standards in interstate controversies as federal law accords 
with the Act’s purpose of authorizing the EPA to create and manage a 
uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation.‖143  With the 
Oklahoma standards having the character of federal law, the Court held that 
―EPA’s reasonable, consistently held interpretation‖ was entitled to 
deference.144 
Admittedly, the Court did not go to great lengths to outline the 
parameters of Chevron’s applicability.  But its rationale is consistent with 
that evidenced in the lower courts’ contract decisions:  the authority being 
interpreted had a federal character; the goal of developing uniform national 
 
 130. Id. at 464. 
 131. 503 U.S. 91 (1992). 
 132. Id. at 110. 
 133. Id. at 94. 
 134. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 33 U.S.C.). 
 135. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 110. 
 136. Id. at 95. 
 137. Id. at 97. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 98. 
 140. Id. at 110. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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policy over time mattered; and the agency’s consistency of interpretation 
supported deference.145  Summed up, the second-order Chevron cases rely 
most clearly on a series of general principles related to the following:  
grants of authority (that is, delegation); expertise; uniformity; and 
procedural detail. 
C.   Developing Generality Principles 
Taken together, the three spectrum cases delineate the bounds within 
which agencies may create their own legitimacy, while the second-order 
decisions offer guidance on how to do that.  American Trucking, UARG, 
and Mead reveal much about Chevron’s role beyond the specific contexts in 
which they arose.146  The doctrine sits at the confluence of separation of 
powers concerns, the nondelegation doctrine, and the relationship between 
procedural and substantive legitimacy.  By preserving the courts’ 
interpretive power for nondelegation concerns, American Trucking creates a 
space outside of which agencies may not have a say in constructing their 
own legitimacy.147  By reinforcing the precise language of a statute in the 
face of lurking nondelegation concerns, UARG cautions that agencies may 
be rigidly confined even under Chevron in the name of fidelity to statute.148  
But by linking democratically legitimizing procedures to Chevron 
eligibility, Mead recognizes that there is room for agencies to construct 
their own legitimacy within the (vast) discretionary space that is left 
over.149 
The second-order decisions provide new examples of what agencies may 
do in that space to enhance their legitimacy.150  Provided they are operating 
under a proper delegation of authority, they can choose procedures that 
reinforce administrative law values and demonstrate that they have applied 
their expertise.151  National uniformity and consistency over time matter as 
well.152  But noting these generality principles’ existence is only the starting 
point.  If they are to be used for assessing intrinsic legitimacy, they must be 
converted to metrics. 
II.   DERIVING METRICS FOR AGENCY BEHAVIOR 
An enduring challenge for administrative law is finding ways to 
legitimize agency behavior that is either unreviewable or rarely reviewed.  
As described in the Introduction, judicial review is the prevailing answer to 
 
 145. The context raises important questions about the authority of both federal agencies 
and federal courts.  Suppose the Court and EPA had agreed that the Oklahoma statute 
unambiguously permitted the discharge.  In the usual Brand X situation, that holding would 
have preclusive effect.  But what about the Erie doctrine?  Surely neither Oklahoma courts 
nor agencies would be bound to that interpretation. 
 146. See generally supra Part I.A. 
 147. See generally supra Part I.A.1. 
 148. See generally supra Part I.A.2. 
 149. See generally supra Part I.A.3. 
 150. See generally supra Part I.B. 
 151. See supra notes 78–88, 118–21 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 123–45 and accompanying text. 
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issues of legitimacy because it acts both as an ex ante and ex post check on 
agency behavior.153  At the same time, Mead instructs that at least 
sometimes, agencies can construct their own legitimacy.154  And the 
second-order Chevron cases underscore the importance of Chevron’s 
generality principles in achieving that result.155 
Others have offered explorations of Chevron’s foundational principles; 
Professor Seidenfeld’s collection of these, and elaboration of his own 
Article III foundation, provides an excellent example.156  In some ways, my 
analysis here overlaps with these other works.  But my aim is different; 
rather than articulating a justification for Chevron, I accept its existence and 
consider what it tells us more broadly about how to assess agency actions.  
Along the way, my analysis provides possible insights into some of 
Chevron’s puzzles.  But the more modest focus is to move forward the 
conversation about deriving metrics for agency behavior. 
In this vein, it is notable that many of the second-order cases rely on 
Skidmore-like factors in deciding whether Chevron deference is 
appropriate.157  Perhaps this sheds light on the Scalia/Breyer debate about 
Chevron’s bright-line versus case-by-case applicability.158  My conclusion 
that Chevron provides generality principles is consistent with Justice 
Scalia’s preference of giving Chevron deference to any authoritative agency 
position.159  But my argument that metrics themselves must consider a 
variety of factors and be tailored to the specific agency action is better 
aligned with Justice Breyer’s approach.  The key difference is that for both 
Justices, the debate concerns the appropriate judicial role.  My focus on 
actions that are insulated from review removes much of the force of Justice 
Scalia’s approach.  This should not be surprising.  What is potentially 
helpful is that removing the emphasis on judicial review can help pinpoint 
just what it is courts provide when they undertake review.  When such 
review is lacking, we seek other ways to ensure that agencies maintain their 
legitimacy. 
A.   The Scope of Agency Authority 
All of the second-order Chevron cases rely to some extent on 
congressional authorization for the relevant federal agency to make the 
interpretations necessary to fulfill its statutory mandate.  Indeed, Professors 
Merrill and Hickman explain the tariff and settlement cases as examples of 
Congress delegating authority to FERC to issue binding orders interpreting 
such contracts.160  This straightforward approach helps distinguish 
 
 153. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 154. See generally supra Part I.A.3. 
 155. See generally supra Part I.B. 
 156. See Seidenfeld, supra note 25. 
 157. See supra note 122 (providing background). 
 158. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 198–206 (framing the debate). 
 159. See generally Scalia, supra note 15. 
 160. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 897 
(2001).  Congress has expressly authorized FERC to adjudicate disputes involving filed 
rates. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (2012). 
2014] CHEVRON’S GENERALITY PRINCIPLES 675 
examples like Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB,161 where the 
Supreme Court held that the NLRB’s interpretations of collective 
bargaining agreements are not reviewable under Chevron because the 
applicable statute delegates enforcement of those agreements to the courts 
rather than the agency.162 
Notice that these examples raise no American Trucking problems.  In 
fact, in the examples provided the agencies are not even making 
interpretations bearing on the scope of their jurisdiction because they are 
not interpreting their statutory mandates.  This context obviates a puzzle 
created by City of Arlington v. FCC.163  There, the Court held that Chevron 
applies regardless of whether the agency interpretation can be said to 
impact the scope of its jurisdiction.164  But the interplay of that holding with 
American Trucking is perplexing.  How can an agency receive Chevron 
deference when it interprets the scope of its jurisdiction yet receive no 
opportunity at all to save an impermissible delegation with a limiting 
construction? 
One answer is that the two issues are simply different:  one involves the 
scope of congressional authority; the other is directed at the scope of agency 
authority.  But consider Professor Pierce’s view that Chevron helps enforce 
the nondelegation doctrine because it changes the incentives for 
Congress.165  Coupled with UARG’s outcome, we can reach the 
straightforward result that express terms of statutory mandates must always 
prevail. 
While the second-order Chevron cases did not present nondelegation or 
jurisdictional issues, they might have:  a party to an adjudication might have 
challenged an agency’s statutory mandate or an interpretation of the 
agency’s jurisdiction had it been raised in the case.  The main point remains 
the importance of fidelity to statute for agency legitimacy.  Indeed, agency 
actions that are rarely or never reviewable must still draw legitimacy from 
fidelity to statute.  Metrics assessing such fidelity are difficult to define in 
the absence of precise instructions from Congress.166  But if such agency 
actions are coupled with procedural protections—like reasoned decision 
making and transparency—they signal to stakeholders and Congress the 
potential need for more precise instructions.  In this way, Congress is again 
incentivized to avoid nondelegation problems with precise mandates, which 
promotes clearer metrics to judge agencies’ fidelity to statute. 
B.   Agency Expertise, Uniformity, and Procedural Detail 
Expertise is frequently cited as a justification for deference to 
agencies,167 but it remains under-theorized from the standpoint of 
 
 161. 501 U.S. 190 (1991). 
 162. Id. at 201–03; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 160, at 898–99. 
 163. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
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 165. Pierce, supra note 47, at 2230–32. 
 166. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 362–63. 
 167. See Hammond, supra note 8. 
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determining exactly what it is and when an agency has applied it.  The 
second-order Chevron cases seem either to take its presence for granted, or 
to make only a very rudimentary distinction between agencies applying 
common law principles like interpretive canons for contracts (which do not 
relate to expertise), and agencies interpreting terms of art like ―just and 
reasonable,‖ which require agencies to apply their specialized knowledge 
and experience.  Nevertheless, there is no doubt that agencies are generally 
the superior institutions to make the scientific and technical judgments 
necessary to inform policymaking.168 
When courts review agency expertise, their own opinions provide 
translations that enable oversight and promote court-agency dialogue.169  
But what about unreviewable agency actions?  ―Expertise‖ is hardly a 
metric.  The second-order decisions (and Chevron itself) make mention of 
expertise, but they often simply presume its existence rather than 
independently analyze it.170  A few courts taking the functional approach 
have determined that agencies do not apply expertise when they engage in 
common law contract interpretation,171 but that approach likewise begs the 
question:  How do we know an agency has applied its expertise?  The 
answer seems to be that at this point, we don’t.  The matter is under-
theorized in the legal scholarship, though progress is underway.172  For 
now, there seems to be an intuitive consensus that expertise provides some 
legitimacy.  How to develop and operationalize this factor is an area ripe for 
further research. 
Numerous scholars also have noted Chevron’s ability to promote 
uniformity.173  Uniformity can have two meanings.  It could reflect 
nationally consistent policy, such as that FERC would develop in deciding 
whether a contract includes just and reasonable rates.  Or it might reflect 
consistency over time, such as was lacking in FERC’s interpretation of its 
OATT provisions.  For agency actions that are not reviewable, uniformity 
ought to be easier to test than expertise because it is capable of objective 
proof. 
Finally, procedural detail is the recurring theme for agency legitimacy.  It 
is in choice of procedures that Mead grounds agencies’ abilities to construct 
their legitimacy.  Further, scholars have demonstrated how procedures are 
tied to legitimacy, both in furthering administrative law values and in 
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promoting procedural justice.174  Like uniformity, procedural detail is not 
particularly difficult to operationalize as a metric because it can be 
objectively observed.  That is (provided the agency is transparent), 
stakeholders can determine without too much difficulty whether an agency 
provided notice of its activities, invited participation, and responded to 
input, and the like. 
C.   Possible Objections 
Many Chevron aficionados may well wonder about the place for political 
accountability in this framework.  After all, Chevron itself is grounded in 
presidential accountability.175  By omitting this theory as a factor for 
measuring legitimacy, I do not mean to suggest that it does not matter.  But 
it is interesting that the factor plays little to no role in the second-order 
Chevron decisions.  As a descriptive matter,176 this omission invites 
rethinking about the place of presidential control in administrative law 
doctrine.  On the other hand, the example in the Introduction involving EPA 
and electricity reliability shows that the President may be directly involved 
in formulating agency policies that are nevertheless unreviewable.  Perhaps 
it may be said that the metrics I suggest here are best used for situations in 
which neither the executive nor the courts are involved in reviewing agency 
behavior.  These agency actions are all the more insulated from scrutiny, 
and all the more in need of indicia of legitimacy. 
Another concern relates to operationalizing these metrics:  all rely on 
agency transparency.  One cannot assess any of them without some sort of 
reviewable record.  On the other hand, agencies need to get their work done 
without creating massive records like they would if they were expecting 
judicial review.  In other words, ossification might be a concern.  My own 
experience with a first attempt at assessing agency behavior in the absence 
of judicial review provides at least anecdotal evidence that transparency 
does not lead inexorably to ossification.177  Agencies’ letters, emails, and 
other informal memoranda are often available under the Freedom of 
Information Act178 (FOIA).179  That said, relying on FOIA is unsatisfactory 
because it is time-consuming, and for some requesters, expensive.  Most 
problematic, it is likely to produce records after the fact, when decisions 
have already been made and it is too late for meaningful participation.  
Publishing more information online and in the Federal Register would 
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create transparency in many cases, and it would promote the ability to 
assess agency behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
Thirty years later, Chevron might be understood as providing a set of 
generality principles.  It represents an intuitive approach to administrative 
law that derives agency legitimacy not from any single source, but from a 
set of principles.  The courts’ use of these principles in second-order 
decisions—those in which agencies have not interpreted their statutory 
mandates—helps justify applying the principles more generally.  The 
possibility of transforming those principles into metrics for assessing 
unreviewable agency behavior is enticing. 
This Essay identifies those principles—fidelity to statute, expertise, 
uniformity, and procedural detail—and suggests a few considerations for 
operationalizing them as metrics.  Although the real work of actual 
operationalization still needs to be done, I hope that this Essay is useful for 
highlighting both the need for further work and the enduring generality of 
Chevron. 
 
